ATTRACTOR™ RESEARCH NOTE—October 2026 Does the RFS Cost $70B or $7B?
George Hoekstra | Hoekstra Trading
Subscriber First: This research is being provided first to Hoekstra RIN Price Outlook subscribers. A version will subsequently be released publicly.
How can the same Renewable Fuel Standard cost $70 billion and $7 billion at the same time?
The short answer is that one number is a measure of the market value of RINs, while the other is a measure of the economic cost of the RFS.
In August 2025, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), relying on analysis by Turner Mason, estimated that EPA’s proposed Renewable Fuel Standard would impose $70 billion per year in compliance costs.
At the same time, Hoekstra Trading, using ATTRACTOR™ 2.0, estimated the economic cost of the proposed RFS at $7 billion per year.
In its June 2025 Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, EPA estimated the 2026 societal fuel cost of the proposed RFS at $7.5 billion, remarkably close to Hoekstra’s estimate.
How can estimates of the cost of the same program differ by a factor of ten?
The answer lies in a fundamental distinction in RIN economics.
$70 billion or $7 billion?
Turner Mason’s calculation can be represented as:
RFS compliance expenditure = RIN quantity × RIN price
The calculation is useful as a measure of the gross market value of the compliance instruments used in the RFS program.
But it is not the cost of the RFS. The two are fundamentally different quantities.
Consider the D6 RIN pool
Much of the D6 minimum volume constraint is satisfied by ethanol. Ethanol is an economically valuable gasoline blendstock. It costs roughly two-thirds as much as petroleum gasoline per gallon, supplies high-value octane, and earns its way into the U.S. fuel supply on purely economic grounds—even on an energy-equivalent basis and without an RFS subsidy.
For reasons to be explained in future Attractor™ Research Notes, the use of ethanol in gasoline has been constrained to a level below the D6 RIN demand. Consequently:
- The D6 pool gets “topped off” with costly D4 biobased-diesel RINs
- The top-off requirement has caused the D6 RIN price to be equal, or nearly equal to the D4 RIN price.
The D4 RIN price reflects the marginal RFS-induced subsidy needed to make bio-based diesel price-competitive when bio-based diesel is required to satisfy a binding RFS constraint.
But it does not follow that every gallon used to satisfy the D6 requirement imposes the same cost as the marginal gallon, represented by the RIN price.
The 14-1 example
Stick with me through this numerical “14-1” example.
Suppose the D6 pool is filled with 15 billion RINs, 14 billion of which are D6 RINs earned by ethanol and one billion of which are D4 RINs earned by bio-based diesel. And, as described above, the price of the D6 RIN is equal to the price of the D4 RIN, which is, say, $1/RIN.
Then the market value of the 15 billion RINs is $15 billion. But the 14 billion D6 RINs earned by ethanol would be there even without the RFS.
The RFS-attributable cost of filling the D6 pool is only the cost caused by the RFS-subsidized D4 RINs in the pool, which is $1 billion.
Turner Mason is calculating the $15 billion number, and AFPM is describing that amount as an RFS-cost.
Both numbers are meaningful. But only the $1 billion is an RFS-attributable cost.
In this simplified example, the counterfactual approach used by EPA and by ATTRACTOR™ attributes cost only to fuel consumption caused by the RFS—not to the 14 billion ethanol RINs generated by fuel that would have been consumed anyway.
Market value is not economic cost
They are fundamentally different quantities.
A RIN price is a marginal price. It measures the economic value of satisfying an RFS constraint at the margin—for example, in the 14-1 example, the cost of supplying the last (most expensive) RIN needed to satisfy a minimum-volume constraint.
It does not mean all RINs used to satisfy that constraint cost that much to supply.
In this case, multiplying a marginal price by a cumulative quantity leads to misinterpretation with far-reaching consequences.
It gives the gross market value of the compliance instruments, which is a meaningful number.
The problem comes when that market value is misinterpreted as the economic cost caused by the RFS. That conflates two fundamentally different quantities that can differ by tens of billions of dollars.
The economic cost of the RFS is the difference between the real resources required to supply U.S. transportation-fuel demand with the RFS in effect and the resources that would have been required to supply the same vehicle-miles traveled without the RFS.
EPA used that ground-up counterfactual analysis to derive its $7.5 billion estimate for the cost of the RFS.
Hoekstra’s ATTRACTOR™ 2.0 spreadsheet does the same thing by solving a system of 26 fundamental economic equations that describe the U.S. fuel system operating under the RFS program. In ATTRACTOR™ 2.0, we solve the system with and without the RFS constraints in effect and get essentially the same answer as EPA.
In doing this, ATTRACTOR™ 2.0 separately identifies the marginal value of satisfying the RFS constraints and the economic cost caused by each constraint.
Those are not the same quantity.
More misconceptions
The 14-1 example applies only to the D6 RIN minimum-volume constraint. Costs related to other RFS constraints must be added to get to a total like $7 billion. And, if the RIN price is higher than $1/RIN, both numbers scale up, increasing the magnitude of the misconception.
The marginal price times cumulative volume treatment is a common pitfall that leads to other misconceptions with far-reaching consequences.
AFPM interprets the Turner Mason $70 billion calculation as the cost of the RFS.
It then goes further to claim that the $70 billion cost is borne by refiners and fuel consumers. Those are two more misinterpretations with far-reaching consequences.
Even if the RFS cost were only $7 billion, it would not follow that refiners collectively suffer a $7 billion economic loss or that consumers pay $7 billion more for transportation fuel.
Similar misinterpretations explain other misconceptions about RIN costs, including something that will soon become especially important in the RIN market.
When a binding minimum-volume constraint is released and the corresponding RIN price falls sharply, the gross market value of outstanding compliance obligations can decline by tens of billions of dollars.
But the economic cost of supplying U.S. transportation fuel will not fall by anything remotely approaching the same amount. That distinction is central to understanding the financial implications of the Big Rip.
AFPM is not alone
The same marginal-price-times-cumulative-volume confusion has appeared throughout the renewable-fuels ecosystem for more than a decade,
from renewable-fuel production and refining to political, regulatory, and legal debates.
Such misconceptions are understandable in view of the complexity of the RIN system. For most of us, it is impossible to keep track of all the different quantities, interactions, and their meanings by relying only on our intuitions and experiences. We cannot keep track of it all in our heads.
The mistake is to think we can.
For such a complex economic system with such non-intuitive outcomes, we need a reliable roadmap of the system and a fundamental economic model like ATTRACTOR™.
The Hoekstra RIN Price Outlook applies this same fundamental economic framework to forecasting RIN prices and identifying changes in the constraints that determine those prices. The quarterly RIN Price Outlook is $5,000 and includes the current forecast plus 3 subsequent quarterly issues. Credit card or purchase orders accepted. To order, Contact: george.hoekstra@hoekstratrading.com | +1 630 330-8159
For those wanting continuing market interpretation, model access, and direct discussion of trading implications, Hoekstra Research Report 10 and Hoekstra Research Report 11 include a six-month ATTRACTOR™ research engagement. Contact: george.hoekstra@hoekstratrading.com | +1 630 330-8159
